The nature and existence of God practice questions.

Pascal argues that, since reason cannot settle whether God exists, one should consider what is gained and lost by wagering either way, and that the possible gain from believing outweighs any loss. His argument is best described as

• an a priori demonstration that God's existence follows from the concept of a perfect being, in the manner of Anselm
• an inference to the best explanation of the order observed in nature
• an appeal to religious experience as evidence for the existence of its object
• a prudential argument about which belief it is rational to cultivate, not evidence that the belief is true

Answer: a prudential argument about which belief it is rational to cultivate, not evidence that the belief is true

The wager concerns the rationality of acquiring a belief, not its truth, which is why the standard objections attack it on those terms: that the same reasoning would support many incompatible gods, and that belief cannot simply be adopted at will.

A fine-tuning argument observes that if certain physical constants had differed very slightly, no complex structures could have formed, and concludes that a designer is the better explanation. Appealing to a multiverse answers this argument by claiming that

• the constants could not in fact have taken any other values than the ones they have
• the values of the constants have not been measured with sufficient accuracy to support the premise
• if very many universes exist with varying constants, observers will necessarily find themselves in one that permits observers
• explanation in physics is impossible, so no conclusion may be drawn from the values of the constants, however precisely they are measured

Answer: if very many universes exist with varying constants, observers will necessarily find themselves in one that permits observers

The reply removes the surprise by changing the reference class, since a hospitable universe is no longer improbable once there are enough attempts. Its cost is that the multiverse is itself a large posit, which is why critics regard the exchange as a trade of one unobservable explanation for another.

Schellenberg's argument from divine hiddenness runs from the claim that a perfectly loving God would always be open to relationship with any person capable of it, together with the claim that

• there are people who, through no fault of their own, do not believe that God exists
• religious traditions disagree with one another about the nature of God
• the amount of suffering in the world is greater than any purpose could require
• no argument for God's existence has ever persuaded every philosopher who examined it

Answer: there are people who, through no fault of their own, do not believe that God exists

The argument is distinct from the problem of evil: its evidence is non-belief rather than suffering, and it targets the attribute of perfect love. The standard replies deny that non-belief is ever wholly non-resistant, or argue that hiddenness serves goods such as the freedom of a response not compelled by evidence.

The Kalam argument and Leibniz's argument from contingency are both cosmological, but they differ in that

• the Kalam argument is a priori while the argument from contingency rests on observation
• the Kalam argument concerns design while the argument from contingency concerns causation
• the Kalam argument needs the universe to have begun to exist, while the contingency argument would apply even to an eternal universe
• the argument from contingency concludes to a designer while the Kalam argument concludes to a moral lawgiver, who issues commands to rational creatures

Answer: the Kalam argument needs the universe to have begun to exist, while the contingency argument would apply even to an eternal universe

Leibniz asks why anything contingent exists at all, and an infinitely old series of contingent things would still stand in need of explanation on his principle of sufficient reason. That is why the two arguments are vulnerable to different objections: one to cosmology, the other to the status of the principle itself.

A version of the ontological argument runs: a maximally great being would exist necessarily and be perfect in every possible world; such a being is at least possible; therefore it exists. Which step carries the weight of the argument?

• The premise that existence is a perfection a thing may lack
• The premise that maximal greatness is possible, since here possibility yields actuality
• The premise that every contingent being depends on a necessary one
• The premise that order in nature calls for an intelligent cause

Answer: The premise that maximal greatness is possible, since here possibility yields actuality

Because necessary existence is built into the concept, granting mere possibility already grants existence in every world, so the argument stands or falls on whether that possibility claim may be granted. An opponent can run the mirror argument from the possibility that no such being exists, which is why the step is disputed rather than obvious.

A theist replies to the evidential problem of evil by arguing that, given how limited our grasp of the relevant goods is likely to be, our failure to see a justifying reason for a particular instance of suffering is weak evidence that there is none. This reply works by

• denying that the suffering described actually occurs
• stating the reasons God actually has for permitting it
• blocking the step from 'no reason is apparent' to 'none exists'
• showing that God and evil are not logically inconsistent

Answer: blocking the step from 'no reason is apparent' to 'none exists'

Sceptical theism attacks the inference rather than supplying an explanation, which is what distinguishes it from a theodicy; and since the evidential argument is probabilistic, it needs no proof of logical consistency, unlike a defence. Its cost is that the same modesty about our grasp of goods may spread to moral reasoning generally.