The nature of knowledge practice questions.

On a coherence theory of truth, what makes a belief true is that

• it is held with sufficient confidence by the person whose belief it is
• it stands in a relation of correspondence to a fact that obtains independently of anyone's beliefs
• it proves useful to act upon in the circumstances in which the believer happens to find herself
• it fits without contradiction into a comprehensive system of beliefs that support one another

Answer: it fits without contradiction into a comprehensive system of beliefs that support one another

The coherence theory locates truth in a belief's relations to other beliefs rather than to the world; the distractors state the correspondence theory, the pragmatic theory and mere conviction. Its standard objection is that more than one comprehensive system can be internally coherent, so coherence alone seems unable to rule out a consistent fiction. Do not confuse it with coherentism about justification, which concerns how beliefs are supported rather than what truth is.

A virtue epistemologist holds that knowledge is belief that is not merely accurate but accurate because it issues from the exercise of a cognitive competence. The advantage claimed for adding the word 'because' is that

• it removes the requirement that a known proposition be true
• it makes knowledge easier to attribute, since competences are simpler to identify than justifications out in the field
• it excludes cases in which a competent believer happens on a truth by luck rather than through the competence
• it makes knowledge depend on the believer being able to state which competence she exercised

Answer: it excludes cases in which a competent believer happens on a truth by luck rather than through the competence

The account is built for the Gettier cases: a well-reasoned belief that lands on a truth by accident is accurate and adroit without being accurate because adroit. Note that this is an externalist condition — the believer need not be able to say what her competence is.

Two epistemologists disagree about a farmer who forms true beliefs about the weather from long experience but can cite nothing in support of them beyond a feeling. One says he is justified, the other that he is not. The disagreement is best described as one between

• externalism and internalism about justification, over whether justifiers must be accessible to the believer
• rationalism and empiricism, over whether the belief arises from experience or from reason alone, as the case of the farmer shows
• the correspondence and coherence theories, over what makes the belief in question true
• scepticism and dogmatism, over whether any beliefs about the future can be justified at all

Answer: externalism and internalism about justification, over whether justifiers must be accessible to the believer

Internalism requires that what justifies a belief be available to the believer on reflection; externalism requires only that the belief be produced in the right way. The farmer's case is designed so that the two verdicts come apart, which is why it recurs in this debate.

Locke argues that there are no innate principles, since children and the unschooled do not assent to them. Leibniz replies that this shows less than Locke supposes, because

• assent is beside the point, since knowledge does not require belief at all
• children do assent to such principles once they are stated slowly enough
• the mind may hold tendencies that experience draws out, like veins in marble
• innate principles are known by revelation rather than by reason

Answer: the mind may hold tendencies that experience draws out, like veins in marble

Leibniz's innatism is dispositional: the figure is already suggested by the marble's veins, and the sculptor's work brings it out. Locke's argument tells only against an innatism of principles consciously held from birth, which is why the dispute is about what innateness would have to mean.

Which account of truth holds that calling a statement true is to do no more than assert the statement itself, so that truth is not a substantial property at all?

• the correspondence account, on which truth is a relation to how things stand
• the deflationary account, on which the truth predicate adds nothing
• the coherence account, on which truth is a matter of fit among beliefs
• the pragmatist account, on which truth is what inquiry would settle on

Answer: the deflationary account, on which the truth predicate adds nothing

The deflationist agrees with nobody about the nature of truth because he denies there is a nature to describe; the other three are all substantive theories, and each of them takes the truth predicate to mark a genuine property or relation.

Wittgenstein's claim that the meaning of a word is its use in the language is directed against which view?

• that words shift in meaning as a language develops over time
• that some sentences are true in virtue of the meanings of their words
• that speakers can be mistaken about what their own words mean
• that a word means by standing for an object, including a private inner one

Answer: that a word means by standing for an object, including a private inner one

The target is the picture on which meaning is a naming relation, which is what makes a private inner sample look like a candidate meaning. The other three are claims Wittgenstein either accepts or does not address, so treating them as his target misplaces the argument.